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This paper starts from two, related sources. The first source is Alexander Wendt’s claim in the final 
chapter of his recent book that, given the quantum mind hypothesis, the state as such is “only a potential 
reality, not an actual one”, which can materialize momentarily “in daily affairs such as voting, paying 
taxes, and going to war, and then disappearing again.” (Wendt 2015, 268) The second source is Axel 
Schmidt’s discussion of the connections between the thought of John Duns Scotus and contemporary 
quantum physics (Schmidt 2003). An important element in that discussion is Scotus’s radicalization of the 
metaphysics of contingency needed to understand human (and divine) freedom, which led to his 
discovery of synchronic contingency whereby free agents have open alternatives at one and the same 
instant of time. 
This paper explores how a metaphysics of dispositional realism – as developed in contemporary analytic 
metaphysics, but retrieving the Aristotelian act-potency distinction – can connect Scotus’s synchronic 
contingency to the kind of metaphysics of social reality proposed by Wendt. Although the connection 
between quantum theory and the Aristotelian notion of potency was already recognized by Heisenberg 
(Heisenberg 1962; Suárez 2007), Wendt only briefly considers these interpretations because he finds that 
they “as such do not capture the phenomenology of mental causation or willing.” (Wendt 2015, 121). 
However, Scotus notably developed the Aristotelian position on potency precisely on the issue of willing 
(Scotus and Wolter 2000). Although no ready-made social ontology is available in or derivable from 
Scotus, key elements in his thinking will be used to develop a social ontology compatible with, or at least 
congenial to, Wendt’s proposal. 
The basic hypothesis is that if human beings are free in the sense of having metaphysically robust 
alternative possibilities for action at one and the same instant of time, then social reality is irreducibly 
more ‘dense’ than what is at any one instant of time actual in terms of the current practices of people. 
What they can do or could have done instead of what they did or are doing is a necessarily irreducible 
aspect of whatever currently actualized choice, and the metaphysics of social reality is therefore to a large 
extent a metaphysics of this unactualized realm of potential alternatives. It is a metaphysics of 
unmanifested powers or dispositions – cf. Wendt’s idea of social structures as “pure potentialities” 
(Wendt 2015, 258) – which stands in certain necessary relationships with the actualized or manifested 
practices and decisions. These relationships are differentiated by their compossibility and concatenation 
with other potentialities as well as with their actualized counterparts. 
A first social-scientific application would be in the field of comparative institutional analysis. Institutions 
qua social structures are powers or potentialities, but their specific dispositional profiles are synchronically 
contingent upon the continued and will of the persons involved to follow their deontic profile of rights, 
obligations, etc. A rash conclusion would be that since the continued existence of any political structure is 
at any time contingent, the attainment of any alternative political or societal structure is possible. Or, 
more radical still, any societal structure at all might perceived as an unjustifiable suppression of 
incompossible alternatives. However, the aspect of necessity introduced by institutions not only 
constrains the initial set of alternatives open to persons, but also drastically enlarges their set of alternative 
possibilities by enabling concatenations with the actions and possibilities of billions of anonymous people. 
Moreover, different institutional set-ups exhibit different dispositional profiles, thereby enabling and 
constraining societies in different ways for actualizing a certain degree of societal perfection. A key 
research question is then which institutional profiles ‘minimally’ constrain and ‘maximally’ enable the 
individuals or societies involved in relation to these different degrees of societal perfection. 
A second social-scientific application would be in economics. For a start, institutional economics can be 
tied in with the previous application as exploring the different degrees of economic prosperity certain 
institutional set-ups enable or constrain. Moreover, as argued by Hülsmann in relation to the possibility of 
economic laws given free human choice (Hülsmann 2003), economic laws do not primarily address the 
relations between successive points in time, but between synchronic points at one instant in time, by 
comparing a certain choice with its real though potential alternatives that are not actualized. Economics 
as framed within a fixed institutional structure therefore studies the dynamics of the synchronic choices 
made by countless persons as their concatenations and incompossibilities mutually impact the possible 
choices and degree of prosperity of other persons involved. Phenomena like savings, investment, capital, 
consumption, profit and loss can then be understood as differentiations within a realm of potential 
courses of action, actualizing different degrees of economic perfection or prosperity.  
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